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8	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
9	NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11	In re Case No. 02-55795 JRG
12	3DFX INTERACTIVE, INC., Chapter 11
13	Debtor.
14	/
15	WILLIAM A. BRANDT, JR., TRUSTEE, Adversary No. 03-5079
16	Plaintiff, vs.
17	NVIDIA CORPORATION, a Delaware
18	corporation; et al.,
19	Defendants.
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22	ORDER
23	I. INTRODUCTION
24	Before the court is the issue of defendants', Nvidia C

Before the court is the issue of defendants', Nvidia Corporation and Nvidia US Investment Company, Inc. (referred to collectively as Nvidia), right to a jury trial in the adversary proceeding brought by the Chapter 11 Trustee, William Brandt. The court heard oral arguments on the issue and allowed supplemental briefing. After

considering the issue of Nvidia's right to a jury trial, the court concludes that Nvidia waived any right it had to a jury trial by failing to make a timely demand.

II. BACKGROUND

The debtor, 3dfx Interactive Inc., filed bankruptcy on October 15, 2002. Nvidia is involved in litigation stemming from its purchase of the assets of the debtor in 2001. Two former landlords of the debtor brought suit against Nvidia alleging theories of successor liability, tortious interference with contract, conspiracy, and other tort-related theories.

The landlord actions were pending adversary proceedings in the bankruptcy court. However, on May 9, 2005, the reference was withdrawn and the landlord actions are now pending in the district court. The parties are in agreement that Nvidia is entitled to a jury trial in the landlord actions.

As part of the debtor's bankruptcy proceeding, on February 18, 2003, Nvidia Corporation filed a proof of claim in the amount of \$20,046,764.15, for setoff and/or recoupment rights. Nvidia alleged that it holds various claims against the debtor as a result of the debtor's acts and omissions relating to the asset purchase agreement. In addition, Nvidia sought indemnity related to the lawsuits filed by the debtor's landlords.

The court appointed a Chapter 11 Trustee in the debtor's bankruptcy in January 2003. On February 24, 2003, the Trustee filed an adversary proceeding against Nvidia. The Trustee asserts two theories of recovery: (1) fraudulent conveyance; and (2) defacto merger. The Trustee's lawsuit stems from the same transaction, Nvidia's purchase of the debtor's assets in 2001.

order 2

Prior to the reference on the landlords' adversary proceedings being withdrawn, Nvidia filed a motion to have the landlords' and the trustee's adversary proceedings consolidated into a single proceeding. This court allowed consolidation for discovery purposes only. On the issue of consolidation for trial, this court has preliminarily concluded the motion was premature given the posture of the cases.

Nvidia concedes that it failed to make a timely demand for a jury trial in the Trustee's adversary proceeding as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38. However, Nvidia argues that its right to a jury trial has not been waived and that the court must grant its request for a jury trial because to do otherwise would infringe upon its constitutional right to have the issues decided by a jury.

The Trustee argues that Nvidia does not have any right to a jury trial in the Trustee's action. Nvidia waived its right by failing to file and serve a timely jury demand. In addition, the Trustee argues that by filing its proof of claim, Nvidia submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court, waiving its right to a jury trial.

III. DISCUSSION

In any proceeding in which a demand for jury trial is made, the bankruptcy court shall determine whether the demand was timely made and whether the demanding party has a right to a jury trial.

Bankruptcy Local Rule 9015-2(a). Under Bankruptcy Local Rules 9015-1

order 3

Bankruptcy Local Rule 9015-2(a) provides:

⁽a) **Determination of Right.** In any proceeding in which a demand for jury trial is made, the Bankruptcy Judge shall, upon the motion of one of the parties, or upon the Bankruptcy Judge's own motion, determine whether the demand was timely made and whether the demanding party has a right to a jury trial. The Bankruptcy Judge may, on the Judge's own motion, determine that there is no right to a jury trial

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and 9015-2(e), Federal Rules 38(a)-(d) and 39 govern the demand for a jury trial.²

At issue is whether Nvidia's failure to serve and file a demand for a jury trial as required by Rule 38(b), constitutes a waiver by Nvidia of a trial by jury.³ Nvidia argues that the court may, in its discretion, allow their jury trial request to be granted under Rule 39(b).⁴

As the court discussed at the hearing on this issue, the discretion of the court to order a jury trial on a motion by a party who has not filed a timely demand is a narrow one. Pacific Fisheries

in a proceeding even if all of the parties have consented to a jury trial.

the jurisdiction created by 28 U.S.C. \$ 1334, FRCivP 38(a)-(d), 39, 47-51, and 81(c) shall govern the demand for and conduct of jury trials."

- (b) **Demand.** Any party may demand a trial by jury of any issue triable of right by a jury by (1) serving upon the other parties a demand therefor in writing at any time after the commencement of the action and not later than 10 days after the service of the last pleading directed to such issue, and (2) filing the demand as required by Rule 5(d). Such demand may be indorsed upon a pleading of the party.
- (d) Waiver. The failure of a party to serve and file a demand as required by this rule constitutes a waiver by the party of trial by jury. A demand for trial by jury made as herein provided may not be withdrawn without the consent of the parties.

² Bankruptcy Local Rule 9015-1 provides, "FRCivP 38(a)-(d) applies in adversary proceedings." Bankruptcy Local Rule 9015-2(e) provides, "In any proceeding within

³ Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38 (b) and (d) provide:

⁴ Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 39(b) provides:

⁽b) **By the Court.** Issues not demanded for trial by jury as provided in Rule 38 shall be tried by the court; but, notwithstanding the failure of a party to demand a jury in an action in which such a demand might have been made of right, the court in its discretion upon motion may order a trial by a jury of any or all issues.

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Corp. v. HIH Cas. & Gen. Ins. Ltd., 239 F.3d 1000, 1002 (9th Cir. 2001). The court's discretion does not permit it to grant relief when the failure to make a timely demand is the result of an oversight or inadvertence. Id.

In its supplemental briefing, Nvidia seeks to rely on the statement in Pacific Fisheries Corporation, 239 F.3d at 1002, that "[a]n untimely request for a jury trial must be denied unless some cause beyond mere inadvertence is shown." According to Nvidia, "cause" to grant a jury trial exists due to the overlap in the landlords' and the trustee's actions, which overlap is so significant that a jury trial must be granted to avoid trampling on Nvidia's constitutional right to a jury trial in the landlords' cases. Nvidia asserts that where jury and non-jury claims are closely related factually, it is appropriate to try all facts to a jury. In addition, according to Nvidia, a right to a jury trial can be foreclosed by a non-jury determination only prior in the "most imperative circumstances, circumstances which in view of the flexible procedures of the Federal Rules we cannot now anticipate." Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510-11 (1959); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 473 (1962); Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970).

However, in reviewing Nvidia's supplemental brief, the court concludes that Nvidia is once again arguing for consolidation couched in terms of the court's discretion under Rule 39(b). Nvidia asks the court to excuse its failure to request a jury trial by arguing "constitutional imperatives." However, the constitutional issues Nvidia raises do not explain Nvidia's failure to request a jury trial timely.

A case cited by Nvidia in support of its position, <u>Cedars-Sinai</u>

Med. Ctr. v. Revlon, Inc., 111 F.R.D. 24, 29-31 (D. Del. 1986), actually comes to the conclusion that the constitutional issue is not a sufficient reason for the court to exercise its discretion under Rule 39(b). In Cedars-Sinai, the court was faced with the issue of whether to grant the plaintiff's untimely request for a jury trial under Rule 39(b) after the plaintiff failed to make a timely demand in its initial lawsuit. The plaintiff brought a second suit against the same defendants on related claims and reserved its right to a jury trial in the second suit. The plaintiff then argued that it was entitled to a jury trial on all issues including those raised in the first lawsuit because it would avoid duplicative trials if all issues could be decided in a single trial.

The district court concluded that the plaintiff had ample time to raise a demand for a jury trial. The court was reluctant to exercise its discretion to grant a jury trial on any of the issues in the first case because the plaintiff had "neglected to take advantage of the clear mandates of the Federal Rules in demanding a jury trial." Id. at 31.5

This decision is consistent with the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that Rule 39(b) does not permit relief where the waiver was caused by oversight or inadvertence. <u>Pacific Fisheries Corp.</u>, 239 F.3d at 1002.

order 6

Noteworthy in <u>Cedars-Sinai</u>, is the fact that the court refused to exercise its discretion under Rule 39(b). It found the issue of whether the plaintiff's Seventh Amendment right was at risk was an appropriate question for consolidation. The court did conclude that consolidation was warranted because of the direct conflict with the plaintiff's Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial that separate jury and non-jury trials would create. Thus, the court determined that the two cases should be consolidated and that the plaintiff should be granted a joint jury trial in both cases. <u>Id</u>. at 32.

This court does not issue any opinion on the consolidation issue and its affect on Nvidia's right to a jury trial in the Trustee's action. The court has concluded that the consolidation issue is premature at this time and only considers the question before it to be whether it should exercise its discretion under Rule 39(b).

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Nvidia's failure to request a jury trial has not been demonstrated to be anything beyond inadvertence or oversight. Nvidia seeks to rely on another concept, namely consolidation, to circumvent the prohibition on granting untimely jury demands due to inadvertence. This is not a sufficient basis under Rule 39(b) for the court to exercise its discretion, because the Ninth Circuit has concluded that the court is not permitted under Rule 39(b) to excuse an inadvertent failure to request a jury trial. Russ v. Standard Ins. Co., 120 F.3d 988, 989-90 (9th Cir. 1997).

The other issue raised by the Trustee is that Nvidia has waived its right to a jury trial by filing a proof of claim in the 3dfx bankruptcy. The Trustee argues that the law is clear that once a party presents a claim to the bankruptcy court, it subjects itself to all of the consequences that attach to that appearance, including the bankruptcy court's power. Granfinanciera S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 59 n.14 (1989).

The Supreme Court stated: "In <u>Granfinanciera</u> we recognize that by filing a claim against a bankruptcy estate the creditor triggers the process of 'allowance and disallowance of claims' thereby subjecting himself to the bankruptcy court's equitable power." <u>Langenkamp v. Culp</u>, 498 U.S. 42, 44 (1990). However, the court need not decide the affect of the filing of the proof of claim on Nvidia's right to a jury trial. Even if the filing of the proof of claim did not amount to a waiver of Nvidia's right to a jury trial, Nvidia is unable to demonstrate that it meets the requirements of Rules 38 and 39 by making a timely demand for a jury trial.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons herein stated, the court concludes that Nvidia

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

For The Northern District Of California

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by fai	ling	to ma	ake	a	time	ly de	emano	d.					
DATED:													

JAMES R. GRUBE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

1	Adversary No. 03-5079							
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4	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT							
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6	FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA							
7	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE - page 1							
8 9	I, the undersigned, a regularly appointed and qualified Judicial Assistant in the office of the Bankruptcy Judges of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California, San Jose, California hereby certify:							
10	That I am familiar with the method by which items to be dispatched in official mail from the							
11	Clerk's Office of the United States Bankruptcy Court in San Jose, California processed on a daily basis: all such items are placed in a designated bin in the Clerk's office in a sealed envelope bearing the address of the addressee, from which they are collected at least daily, franked, and deposited in the							
12	United States Mail, postage pre-paid, by the staff of the Clerk's Office of the Court;							
13 14	That, in the performance of my duties, on the date set forth below, I served the ORDER in the above case on each party listed below on the next page by depositing a copy of that document in a sealed envelope, addressed as set forth, in the designated collection bin for franking, and mailing.							
15	I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct.							
16	Executed on at San Jose, California.							
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1 Adversary No. 03-5079 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE - page 2 8 9 Nanette Dumas, Esq. William A. Brandt, Jr. Office of the U.S. Trustee Kyle Everett DEVELOPMENT SPECIALIST, INC. 10 280 So. First Street, Rm. 268 San Jose, CA 95113-3099 345 California Street, Suite 1150 San Francisco, CA 94104 11 Stephen H. Pettigrew, Esq. David M. Shannon, Esq. 12 Jonathon S. O'Donnell **NVIDIA CORPORATION** L. Peter Ryan 2701 San Tomas Expressway, MS01 MBV LAW LLP 13 Santa Clara, CA 95050 855 Front Street 14 San Francisco, CA 94111 Stephen T. O'Neill, Esq. LAW OFFICES OF MURRAY & MURRAY 15 Robert Gebhard, Esq. SEDGWICK DÉTERT MORAN & ARNOLD 19330 Stevens Creek Blvd., # 100 16 Cupertino, CA 95014-2526 One Embarcadero Center, 16th Floor San Francisco, CA 94111-3628 17 Robert E. Izmirian, Esq. Peter G. Bertrand, Esq. Robert P. Varian, Esq. BUCHALTER NÉMER FIELDS et al. ORRICK HERINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP 18 333 Market St., 29th Floor The Orrick Building 19 San Francisco, CA 94105-2130 405 Howard Street San Francisco, CA 94105-2669 20 Betty M. Shumener Henry H. Oh, Esq. Steven D. Seiler, Esq. 21 DLP PIPER RUDNICK GRAY CARY LLP Douglas A. Applegate, Esq. 550 So. Hope Street, Suite 2300 SEILER EPSTEIN ZIEGLER & APPLEGATE 22 Los Angeles, CA 90071-2631 153 Townsend Street, Suite 950 San Francisco, CA 94107 23 John L. Fitzgerald PINNACLE LAW GROUP Bruce L. Simon, Esq. 425 California Street, Suite 1800 Mark C. Molumphy, Esq. San Francisco, CA 94104 COTCHETT PITRÉ SIMON & McCARTHY 25 San Francisco Airport Office Center 840 Malcolm Road, Suite 200 26 Burlingame, CA 94010 27 28